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I present a study of ownership of firms under government rent seeking. Using its control of
regulated inputs, a government agency extracts rents from a manager who undertakes an
investment. Such a government rent seeking activity leads to a typical hold-up problem.
Government ownership is shown to serve as a second best commitment mechanism
through which the government agency will restrain itself from the rent seeking activity and
even offer the manager support and favor such as tax breaks and subsidies. This
mechanism works at a cost as government ownership compromises ex post managerial
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market economy.
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paper.I. Introduction
For the past two decades, China has registered remarkable economic growth, despite the
absence of a adequate checks and balances system to hold governments, especially local
government authorities, accountable. Because of lack of institutional mechanisms that will
restrain them from rent seeking activities, local governments, using their leverage over
public resources and regulatory authorities, have been able to levy arbitrary fees and
charges on, and even extort bribes from private enterprises.1 As a result, private enterprises
played only a minor role during the last two decades. By 1993 the private sector accounted
for only about 15 percent of national industrial output.
Nevertheless, the remarkable growth in China has been spearheaded by the ‘non-state’
firms (firms not owned by the state government) owned and controlled by local
governments. The share of these firms in the national industrial output increased from 22
percent to 42 percent between 1978 and 1993 (China Statistics Yearbook, 1994). A striking
example of these non-state firms is local government-controlled enterprises in rural areas
known as township-village enterprises (TVEs), whose share in the national industrial
output increased from 9 percent in 1978 to 27 percent in 1993. More importantly, despite
the fact that local governments have sometimes remained predatory towards these firms,2
they have been in many cases instrumental in making these firms a driving force behind
China’s recent economic development. Studies have shown that local governments have
been responsible in providing ‘critical inputs’ (such as land), securing loans, and offering
political support to these non-state firms.3 To put it differently, the ‘grabbing hand’ of
these local government authorities, using the term of Frye and Shleifer (1997), have turned
into the ‘helping hand’ under local government ownership.
Motivated by this observation, I study in this paper ownership of firms in an environment
where there is a lack of institutional frameworks to hold governments accountable. I argue
that, in such an environment, government ownership may serve as a second best
commitment mechanism to restrain local governments from rent seeking activities. Under
government ownership, a government subjects its interest to the performance of firms
under its control and hence incentives of private agents managing these firms. To entice
better efforts from these private agents and ultimately advance its own interest, the
government may become less inclined to extract rents from these private agents and
sometimes may even volunteer to offer ‘help’ through tax break or subsidy. In contrast,
1 Indeed, local government agencies collecting illicit fees, charges, and tolls has been one of the major
concerns during the recent efforts in reforming government organizations and the tax system in China.
2 See Byrd and Gelb (1990) and Whiting (1995).
3 For example, Byrd (1990) suggested that the presence of local governments in the ownership of TVEs had
been pivotal in securing loans from government-controlled banks; see also Zhang and Ronas (1996). Nee
(1992) maintained that TVEs had benefited from the political connections of local governments in expanding
their market reach. Others like Chang and Wang (1994), Naughton (1994, 1996), and Putterman (1997)
argued that local governments had contributed ‘critical inputs’, such as land, initial collective assets, and
human capital to the development of these enterprises. Local governments were also said to provide political
protection for TVEs (Che and Qian, 1998b; Li, 1996).2
when firms are privately owned, the government will extract rents from private agents as
much as possible, as it has little interest in these firms. As a result, government owned
firms may suffer less from government rent seeking activities than private firms and
therefore will have more room for development. Che and Qian (1998b) delivered the
similar idea that government ownership may help reduce government rent seeking
activities. In particular, they showed that local government ownership can limit predatory
behavior of the state. This study complements their work by demonstrating that local
government ownership can limit rent seeking activities of the local government itself.
During (at least the early stage of) China’s economic transition, local governments
controlled the allocation of various inputs, such as land, electricity, water, license, financial
capital, and so forth. Such privilege enjoyed by local governments over private parties such
as entrepreneurs and managers is the institutional basis for government rent seeking and is
the starting point of this paper. Similar to this paper, Li (1996), Chen and Rozelle (1999),
Hsiao et al. (1998), and Tian (2000) emphasized such privilege as well. However, different
from this paper, these works derived their analyses from the assumption that (non-corrupt)
local governments themselves are useful in production. Consequently, the focus of these
papers was, in a sense, how to best make use of the local governments’ ‘efforts’. This
paper, on the other hand, recognizes explicitly that (1) institutionally, the local government
is not held accountable and hence may be corrupt; and (2) the local government is perhaps
as counter-productive in production as it may be technically useful. To deviate from these
studies, this paper thus considers an environment where there is no need to offer the local
government incentives in production. I show that, even in such an environment, ownership
may be allocated to the local government. In particular, by recognizing the possibility that
the government-controlled input can be ‘bought’ on the market (through bribery), this
paper address the classical question of Coase: whether the transaction of the input should
take place on the market, or within the boundary of the firm (i.e., by granting the local
government the ownership of the firm).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
offers the benchmark analysis of private ownership. It shows that government rent seeking
may completely wipe out the manager’s incentives to initiate an investment. Section 4
analyzes government ownership, where I show that the manager will have better incentives
to initiate the investment as the government agency may restrain itself from rent seeking
under government ownership. I extend this analysis and deliver a number of comparative
static results in section 5. Section 5 links this analysis to a number of stylized empirical
observations concerning TVEs. Section 7 concludes.
2. The model
There are two risk-neutral players: a manager and a government agency. The manager has
know-how about an investment project and is responsible for initiating and managing the
project. To initiate an investment, the manager has to spend the first effort, denoted by e.
By spending the effort e, the manager incurs a private cost that is denoted as e as well.
Once the effort is sunk, the investment takes place with probability m(e) where m(.) is
differentiable, strictly increasing and concave, and satisfies the Inada condition.
After it is initiated, the investment needs an input and the government agency is a body that
is in charge of the allocation of this input. One can think of this input as either a license, or
a quota, or a piece of land, or access to financial capital. And the government agency can3
be any government regulatory organization in reality, such as a local community
government.4 Using the term of Banerjee (1997), I will refer to this input as a ‘slot’. The
government agency is delegated (by a higher level government, which is not modeled in
this model) to allocate the slot to an investment project at a regulated price. For simplicity,
I assume that the regulated price is zero.
However, the government agency is not held accountable. While the slot should be
allocated to the investment at the regulated price, the government agency will use its
authority to illicitly collect a fee for the slot. I denote the fee by B. In particular, once the
investment is initiated, the agency will make a take-it-or-leave-it offer that demands the
manager to pay B and otherwise the slot will not be allocated to the investment. The fee
may be either collected by the government agency to cover its local fiscal expenditures5 or
to put into its own pocket, in which case, this fee may be better described as a bribe. In any
case, the Court does not enforce the illicitly charged fee. Instead, I assume that the
transaction of fee-slot is enforced either in the form of spot transactions or through some
informal enforcement mechanisms such as reputation. Thus once the manager pays the fee
to the agency, the agency allocates the slot. If the slot is not allocated, the investment will
be cut short and will generate a low return that is normalized to zero. If the slot is
allocated, the investment continues and when completed will yield a positive (expected)
return R.6 The return is not contractable.
The amount of the expected return R is determined by two factors. One is the second
managerial effort, denoted by a, in implementing the investment. The manager incurs a
private cost, also denoted by a, for this effort. The other factor is an unverifiable control
decision x Î [0, ¥), which affects not only the total amount of the investment return, but
also the marginal productivity of the managerial effort a. While there are many ways to
model the decision in the context of government-business relation, what I have particularly
in mind is the hiring of excessive workers. In other words, x is the number of excessive
workers that are hired. One of the major concerns regarding government owned firms is
over-staffing (Shleifer and Vishny (1994)). Like their counterparts in other countries, one
of the most important objectives of local governments in China is in fact to create
employment opportunities for their constituents; Rozelle and Boisvert (1994), Jin and Qian
(1998), Putterman (1997), Song and Du (1990).
Although I interpret the decision x as the hiring of excessive workers, one should keep in
mind that the decision can in fact be more generally thought of as any control decision that
allows the government agency to interfere with the normal investment operation under
government ownership. For example, one can also think of x as an activity that diverts
4 In other words, in this paper I do not consider government as a single body. Instead I view government as a
collection of various government agencies with the state government on the top setting regulations and
delegating lower level government agencies to carry out these regulations. Of course, my analysis focuses on
a government agency that is charge of a particular regulation while leaving the higher level (state)
government outside the model.
5 Many local government agencies in China have extra budget that is not closely monitored by higher level
governments (Qian and Weingast, 1996) and is disposable by these local government agencies for the local
fiscal expenditures.
6 The expectation is taken conditional on the investment having taken place.4
funds used in the investment for public expenditure. However, to focus my analysis, I will
interpret the decision as the hiring of excessive workers for the remainder of this paper.
As I model the control decision as the hiring of excessive workers, the government agency
in this model does not have any productive role (from the technological point of view) in
the investment. This is not to say that in reality local governments do not play any positive
roles in the development of non-state enterprises. Many times, they do, as some of the
existing studies suggest. However, I choose to model the control decision by the
government agency as something unproductive in order to highlight that, even in this
extreme case, government ownership may still Pareto dominate private ownership.7
More specifically, I assume that R = f(a, x) where f(., .) is differentiable, and concave in
{a, x}. In addition, f(., .) is strictly increasing in a, and satisfies the Inada condition, but is
strictly decreasing in x. The hiring of excessive workers reduces the investment return:
¶f/¶x <0; and it reduces the marginal productivity of the managerial effort as well:
¶
2f/(¶a¶x) <0.8 The making of the control decision depends on the ownership form of the
investment. I consider two ownership forms: private ownership, and government
ownership. Under private ownership, the manager controls the hiring of excessive workers;
under government ownership, the decision right is allocated to the government agency.
Some private benefits accrue to the owner from the control decision. In the context of
hiring of excessive workers, these private benefits can be best thought of as political
benefits pertinent only to the government agency. Thus without loss of generality, I assume
that the manager derives no political benefits from over-staffing, whereas for the
government agency, the political benefits increase in the number of excessive workers. For
simplicity, I assume that the political benefits of over-staffing have no (net) social value.
The propensity of the government agency in pursuing the political agenda of employment,
however, depends on factors such as the political climate the government agency faces and
the local economic condition it sees (see Byrd and Gelb (1990) for example). These factors
determine both the pressures as the reward for the government agency in expanding local
employment. Instead of modeling these factors explicitly, I choose a simple parameter q to
represent the propensity in which the government agency will pursue its political agenda.
In particular, the political benefits for the government agency is denoted by U(x, q).
U(x, q) is differentiable, strictly increasing and concave in x, and satisfies the Inada
condition, whereas qÎ{qh, ql} such that ¶U(x, qh)/¶x<¶U(x, ql)/¶x. In other words, the
government agency finds the marginal political gain of hiring additional workers much
higher in the state ql than in the state qh. Correspondingly, the government agency in the
state ql is referred to as being ‘pro politics’ and the government agency in the state qh is
referred to as a (relatively) ‘pro business’ government agency. Naturally, the government
agency has better information concerning the working of the factors that will determine its
propensity in pursuing the political agenda as compared to the manager. Thus, without loss
of generality, I assume that the actual state of nature is revealed to the government agency
7 Alternatively, I can model the control decision as some productive activity, which will only strengthen the
argument that government ownership may dominate private ownership.
8 This assumption can be justified easily. For example, imagine a scenario where over-staffing requires more
managerial effort in monitoring (say, to prevent theft or embezzlement) leading to lower marginal
productivity under diminishing marginal productivity.5
only. In contrast, the manager has only the a priori knowledge that the agency is pro
business (q = qh) with probability p and is pro politics (q = ql) with probability 1 – p.
Nevertheless, the manager may form his posterior belief about the agency’s type based
upon the way in which the government agency behaves.9
Figure 1
Sequence of events
In addition to allowing the owner to take control of the decision x and receive the political
benefits associated with the decision (if any), the ownership form also determines the
redistribution of the investment return. Under private ownership, the investment return
accrues to the manager only. I assume that the investment return is divided between the
government agency and the manager under government ownership. To avoid the cost of
going into details of how these shares are determined endogenously, for the purpose of this
paper I simply assume that the government agency receives lG share of the investment
return and the manager receives 1 - lG share of the investment return.10 The government
agency’s objective is to maximize its political benefits plus the rents that it can extract
from the investment project, either through the fee it collects or through the investment
return it shares under government ownership. The manager’s objective is to maximize the
amount of rents he will receive from the investment, net of the cost of his efforts. Figure 1
summarizes the sequence of events under private ownership and under government
ownership.
The appropriate solution concept for the ensuing analysis is sequential equilibrium.
However, this solution concept often allows multiple equilibria to exist. To eliminate
‘unreasonable’ equilibria, I will apply the ‘intuitive criterion’ test (Cho and Kreps, 1987)
whenever necessary. Thus an equilibrium in the rest of this paper refers to a sequential
equilibrium that survives the ‘intuitive criterion’ test. In the context of this model, the
‘intuitive criterion’ test checks whether the manager has a ‘reasonable’ posterior belief
after the government agency deviates from an equilibrium behavior. Loosely speaking,
9 The manager’s posterior belief becomes irrelevant if the agency does not allocate the slot, in which the
project will be terminated.
10 The manager shares the investment return perhaps because he is the only one who has the know-how of
the investment. It is straightforward to endogenize these shares, using the framework of Grossman, Hart and
Moore (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990) for example.
The manager chooses not






fee B ³ 0
The manager refuses to pay, the
slot is not allocated, and the
investment is terminated
The manager pays
the fee and the
slot is allocated
The manager chooses the
effort a and the owner
chooses the control decision x
The investment return
is generated6
suppose a government agency of a particular type (pro business or pro politics) will never
choose action A under any posterior belief of the manager, and yet a government agency of
the other type might choose action A under some posterior belief of the manager. Then
according to the ‘intuitive criterion’ test, a posterior belief r(A) that assigns a positive
probability to a government agency of the first type given that A is observed is considered
‘unreasonable’.
Before I begin my analysis, I should make the note that, in the context of this model,
private ownership is the efficient arrangement if the government agency is held
accountable (i.e., prevented from collecting arbitrary fees). This is because, under private
ownership, the manager’s efforts, both ex post in implementing the investment and ex ante
in initiating the investment, reach the social optimum; and no excessive workers will be
hired. With this in mind, I turn next to an environment of government rent seeking.
3. The benchmark: private ownership
I begin my analysis with the case where the investment is privately owned. I will show as a
benchmark that under private ownership the threat of government rent seeking may wipe
out ex ante incentives of the manager in initiating an investment. I proceed in my analysis
using backward induction. Notice first that, after the fee is paid and the slot is allocated, the
manager will hire no excessive workers because he derives no political benefit from this
and will choose effort a to maximize f(a, 0) – a since he has the claim for all the investment
return. Let a
p denote the manager’s optimal (ex post) effort under private ownership. The
manager’s payoff at this stage will be f(a
p,0 )–a
p.
Second, consider the stage where the government agency charges a fee for the slot. Since
the government agency has all the bargaining power, the government agency will fully
exploit its bargaining power and set the fee B
p = f(a
p,0 )–a
p. Since, the manager’s payoff
will be zero without the slot being allocated to the investment, the manager will pay this
fee. As a result, once the investment is initiated, the manager will receive a zero payoff V
p
from the investment. Finally, consider the stage where the manager chooses his effort in
initiating the investment. Anticipating a zero payoff from his investment, the manager will
therefore never choose an effort to initiate the investment. The next proposition
summarizes the observation.
Proposition 1: Under private ownership, there exists a unique equilibrium where the
investment is never initiated. Proof: omitted.
Proposition 1 highlights a typical hold-up problem faced by the manager in this model.
Once the effort of initiating the investment is sunk and the investment gets started up, the
government agency will use its control of the slot to extract all surplus from the manager.
Anticipating this, the manager will never put forward any effort to initiate the investment.
Because the investment is never initiated, both the government agency and the manager
will receive a zero payoff.7
4. From grabbing hand to helping hand
In contrast to private ownership, government ownership can serve as a credible
commitment device for the government agency to restrain itself from excessive rent
seeking. I show in this section that the government agency may become less predatory
toward the investment it owns than the investment the manager owns, and as a result,
government ownership will encourage the manager to initiate the investment. I proceed in
my analysis in three stages: the ex post stage, the interim stage, and the ex ante stage. In
the ex post stage, the government agency chooses the hiring of excessive workers and the
manager chooses an effort in implementing the investment. In the interim stage, the
government agency collects the fee. In the ex ante stage, the manager chooses his effort in
initiating the investment.
Ex post
Consider first the stage after the fee is paid and the slot is allocated. At this stage, the
government agency chooses x, the number of excessive workers to be hired,
simultaneously with the manager choosing the effort a in implementing the investment.
Anticipating the managerial effort a, the government agency chooses x to maximize its
payoff:
lGf(a, x) + U(x, q)
where qÎ{qh, ql}. Let x(a, q) be the reaction function of the government agency thus
generated.
Lemma 1: The reaction function of the government agency x(a, q) is strictly decreasing in
the managerial effort a and for any managerial effort a, x(a, qh)<x ( a ,ql). Proof: see
Appendix
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is as follows. First, I have assumed that the marginal
productivity of the managerial effort a decreases as more excessive workers are hired (i.e.,
¶
2f(a, x)/(¶a¶x) <0). Given this assumption, the marginal cost of hiring excessive workers
increases as the managerial effort a increases (since ¶
2f(a, x)/(¶x¶a) <0—notice that
¶f(a, x)/¶x <0). Therefore x(a, q) decreases in the managerial effort a. Second, I have also
assumed that the marginal benefit of hiring excessive workers is higher when the
government agency is pro politics as compared to when the government agency is pro
business (i.e., ¶U(x, ql)/¶x>¶U(x, qh)/¶x). Thus the pro business government agency tends
to hire fewer excessive workers than the pro politics government agency does. The
manager, on the other hand, chooses the effort a to implement the investment while
anticipating the government agency’s interference in hiring decisions. Given the
anticipated hire of excessive workers x, the effort a maximizes the manager’s payoff:
(1 - lG)f(a, x) – a.
Let a(x) be the reaction function of the manager thus generated.
Lemma 2: The reaction function of the manager a(x) is strictly decreasing in x. Proof:
omitted.8
The intuition underlying this result is evident. Since the marginal productivity of the
managerial effort decreases when a larger number of excessive workers are hired, the
manager will put forward the less effort when he anticipates that a larger number of
excessive workers will be hired. Given the manager’s posterior belief r, the (subgame)
equilibrium choices of a and x(q) are determined when the anticipated choice of the
managerial effort equals the actual managerial effort and the anticipated hiring of excessive
workers equals the average hiring of excessive workers by the pro business and pro politics
government agencies. In other words:
rx(a, qh)+( 1-r)x(a, ql)=a
-1(x)
Since both the manager’s reaction function and the government agency’s reaction function
are downward sloping, a condition is needed to ensure that the equilibrium choices of a and
x(q) are stable. I assume that:
¶x(a, q)/¶a > (da(x)/dx)
-1 [1]11
for both qh and ql. With this condition, the equilibrium choices of a and x under
government ownership, denoted as a
G and x
G(q), can be shown in Figure 2. In Figure 2,
given the choice of the managerial effort a
G, the pro business government agency would
choose x
G(qh) and the pro politics government agency would choose x
G(ql). The expected




And given this expected choice of the government agency, the manager chooses his effort
a
G. For the rest of my analysis, I assume that condition [1] always holds.
Figure 2
The equilibrium choice of a and x under government ownership
11 This condition holds if lGfxa
2 > lGfxxfaa+U xxfaa holds for both qh and ql,w h e r ef aa is the second derivative
of f(.,.) with respect to a, fxx is the second derivative of f(.,.) with respect to x, fxa is the cross derivative of












Proposition 2: Given the manager’s posterior belief r, there exists a unique equilibrium for
the continuation game, where:
1. the pro business government agency’s choice of excessive workers x
G(r, qh) is strictly
less than that of the pro politics government agency x
G(r, ql);
2. the managerial effort a
G(r) increases in the manager’s posterior belief r;a n d
3. the hiring of excessive workers decreases in the manager’s posterior belief r.
Proof: omitted.
The first part of Proposition 2 follows directly from Lemma 1. The second part of
Proposition 2 is derived from the first part in conjunction with Lemma 2. Because the
government agency hires a smaller number of excessive workers when it is pro business
than when it is pro politics, the managerial effort increases if the manager believes that the
government agency is more likely to be pro business. The third part of Proposition 2
follows from the second part of this proposition and Lemma 1.
Proposition 2 has two important implications. First, the government agency may solicit
efforts from the manager by affecting the latter’s posterior belief. In particular, the
government agency may motivate the manager by convincing him that it will not
extensively interfere with the investment operation (through the hiring of excessive
workers). Second, the pro business government agency derives a larger marginal value
from increased managerial effort than the pro politics government agency. This is because,
according to Proposition 2, the government agency hires fewer excessive workers when it
is pro business, and the marginal productivity of the managerial effort is higher when there
are fewer excessive workers. This observation is summarized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 3: The marginal value of the (ex post) managerial effort is larger for the pro
business government agency than for the pro politics government agency. Proof: see
Appendix.
Interim
I now turn my analysis to the stage where the government agency charges the fee for the
slot. At this stage, the manager forms the posterior belief regarding whether the
government agency is pro business or pro politics, based on how the government agency
sets the fee. For simplicity, I will focus only on pure strategy adopted by the government
agency, which is defined as the fee charged by the government agency given the state of
nature q. There can be two kinds of (pure strategy) sequential equilibrium: separating
equilibrium and pooling equilibrium. In a separating equilibrium, the pro business
government agency and the pro politics government agency charge a different amount of
fee. Let Bh denote the fee charged by the pro business government agency and Bl be that by
the pro politics government agency, Bh ¹ Bl. In such an equilibrium, the manager has the
posterior belief such that r(B = Bh)=1a n dr(B = Bl) = 0. In a pooling equilibrium, the pro
business government agency and the pro politics government agency charge the same
amount of fee. Let Bhl denote the fee thus charged. The manager’s posterior belief will then
be r(B = Bhl) = p. Under the pooling equilibrium, the government agency’s type is not
revealed. This section focuses mainly on the separate equilibrium whereas the next section
will focus on the pooling equilibrium.10
According to Lemma 3, the marginal value of the managerial effort is greater for the pro
business government agency. Thus, in a separating equilibrium the pro business
government agency can charge a smaller amount of fee than what the pro politics
government agency is willing to so as to convince the manager that it is pro business. Once
the manager is convinced that the government agency is pro business, and therefore will
not put a large number of excessive workers on the staff, he will exert better efforts in
implementing the investment, as Proposition 2 suggests. In other words, the pro business
government can motivate the manager by restraining itself from rent seeking activities.
Define v
G(r =0 )( a n dv
G(r = 1)) as the payoff received by the manager in a separating
equilibrium after he pays the fee charged by the pro politics (and pro business) government
agency. These payoffs determine the maximum amount of fee that the pro politics (and pro
business) government agency can extract in a separating equilibrium.
Lemma 4: Under government ownership, the maximum amount of fee that the government
agency can extract in a separating equilibrium is higher when the government agency is
pro business, i.e., v
G(r =1 )>v
G(r = 0). Proof: see Appendix.
Proposition 3: Under government ownership there exists a unique equilibrium where
1. the amount of fee charged by the pro business government agency is strictly less than
that charged by the pro politics government agency, i.e., Bh <B l;a n d
2. the pro politics government agency extracts all the rents from the manager, i.e.,
Bl=v
G(r = 0); whereas the pro business government agency does not, i.e.,
Bh<v
G(r =1 ) .
Proof: see Appendix.
The intuition for these results is as follows. First, in order to separate itself from the pro
politics government agency, the pro business government agency must charge a fee that is
less than the fee that the pro politics government agency charges. Otherwise, the pro
politics government agency could charge the same amount of fee as the pro business
government agency does and at the same time receive better managerial efforts from the
deceived manager.
Second, when the pro business government agency charges a smaller amount of fee than
the pro politics government agency does, the pro politics government agency faces a trade-
off. It can either receive better managerial efforts with the smaller fee that the pro business
government agency charges, or it can receive reduced managerial efforts with the larger fee
it charges in equilibrium. Since the marginal value of the managerial efforts is smaller for
the pro politics government agency, the pro politics government agency will opt for the
second choice when the fee charged by the pro business government agency is sufficiently
small.
Third, given that the pro politics government agency trades off managerial efforts for a
larger amount of fee, the pro politics government agency will fully exploit its bargaining
power and extract all the rents from the manager. Thus Bl =v
G(r = 0). Furthermore, the
payoff received by the manager after the fee is paid is higher when the government agency
is known to be pro business in equilibrium, i.e., v
G(r =1 )>v
G(r = 0), because the
managerial efforts are higher and fewer excessive workers are hired in this case. Given that11
the pro business government agency charges a smaller amount of fee than the pro politics
government agency, it follows that Bh <v
G(r =1 ) .
Ex ante
Proposition 3 reveals a central observation of this paper. That is, government ownership
can serve as a credible commitment mechanism through which the government agency
may restrain itself from fully exercising its bargaining power and therefore alleviate the
hold-up problem. As a result, the manager may receive a positive amount of payoff from
the investment under government ownership. Indeed, the ex ante payoff for the manager,
denoted by V
G, will be V
G =p ( v




1. The manager has a positive incentive to initiate the investment under government
ownership; and
2. government ownership Pareto dominates private ownership.
The analysis presented above offers a new insight as to why local government owned
firms, instead of private firms, have become a driving force behind China’s rapid economic
growth. When input markets are not liberalized so that inputs (or ‘slots’), especially those
crucial to business activities, are under government control, private incentives will suffer
from government rent seeking activities in an environment where there are lacking
institutional mechanisms to hold governments accountable. Government ownership, on the
other hand, induces governments to restrain themselves from fully exercising their
bargaining power, thus protects private incentives that are pivotal to economic
development. When other conditions are right (such as the presence of cheap labor and
market opportunities) as in the case of China, government ownership allows the non-state
sector to take off.
This analysis also unravels a puzzling issue regarding China’s local government owned
firms. Despite the fact that these enterprises have contributed significantly to China’s
remarkable economic growth, empirical studies have found local governments to use their
enterprises to pursue their political agenda, leading to the possible inefficiency of local
government owned enterprises. This analysis suggests that the possible inefficiency in
government ownership (government intervention in investment operation and the need to
solicit managerial incentives) actually prompts the government agency to restrain itself
from abusing its government authority. More importantly, the analysis reveals a possibility
that a rent seeking government agency may turn its grabbing hand vis-à-vis private firms to
a helping hand towards government-owned firms. To see this, notice that Bh i ss e ti ns u c ha
way that the incentive compatibility constraint for the pro politics government agency is
binding. That is:
lGf(a
G(r =0 ) ,x
G(r =0 ,ql)) + U(x
G(r =0 ,ql), ql)+B l =
lGf(a
G(r =1 ) ,x
G(r =1 ,ql)) + U(x
G(r =1 ,ql), ql)+B h.
Since Bl =( 1-lG)f(a
G(r =0 ) ,x
G(r =0 ,ql)) – a(r = 0), I have:12
Bh = f(a
G(r =0 ) ,x
G(r =0 ,ql)) + U(x
G(r =0 ,ql), ql)–a ( r =0 )
–[ lGf(a
G(r =1 ) ,x
G(r =1 ,ql)) + U(x
G(r =1 ,ql), ql)].
In other words, Bh ³ 0 if and only if:
f(a
G(r =0 ) ,x
G(r =0 ,ql)) + U(x
G(r =0 ,ql), ql)–a ( r =0 )
³l Gf(a
G(r =1 ) ,x
G(r =1 ,ql)) + U(x
G(r =1 ,ql), ql). [2]
Corollary 2: Under government ownership, the pro business government agency will
charge a fee to the firm if [2] holds, but will offer a subsidy otherwise.
To summarize this section, I present the next proposition, which should be straightforward
following the discussion above.
Proposition 4: Suppose that B Î (-¥, ¥). Then under government ownership there exists a
unique equilibrium where:
1. the pro business government agency collects a smaller amount of fee than the pro
politics government agency does when condition [2] holds;
2. the pro business government agency offers a subsidy while the pro politics government
agency collects a fee when condition [2] does not hold;
3. the manager has a positive incentive to initiate the investment; and
4. government ownership Pareto dominates private ownership.
Proof: omitted.
The government agency is delegated by a higher level government to regulate the
allocation of the slot and the regulated price of the slot is zero. Hence the subsidy can also
be interpreted as the government agency hiding fiscal revenues at the firm it owns. This
interpretation sheds light on a phenomenon that has often been observed in China. That is,
local governments often offer tax rebates and concessions to the local government owned
enterprises without the state approval (see Berkowitz and Li, 1999). Such a practice,
known as ‘hiding fortune at your constituents’ or cang fu yu min is in fact opposed by the
state out of concern that this will result in a loss of the state’s fiscal revenues. This practice
is in sharp contrast with the behavior of local governments collecting arbitrary fees and
taxes vis-à-vis private enterprises. Nevertheless, according to this analysis, by neglecting
the revenue collection for the state, the local governments can actually motivate managers
to take better efforts and thus increase revenues (investment returns) that accrue to the
local governments directly.
5. From government ownership to private ownership
The previous section has demonstrated an unequivocal case where government ownership
Pareto dominates private ownership. The case is made with two assumptions that turn out
to be quite restrictive. First, when the manager is denied of the slot, the investment cannot
take place and therefore yields zero return. Second, when necessary to induce the
managerial effort, the government agency can offer an unlimited amount of subsidy. In this13
section, I drop these two restrictive assumptions and assume instead that, (1) when the
manager is denied of the slot, the investment can still take place but will yield a smaller
amount of return, for simplicity, this amount is assumed to be fixed and is denoted by r;
and (2) the government agency faces a fiscal budget constraint B such that B Î [- B, ¥). I
adopt these two alternative assumptions to offer a more balanced comparison between
private ownership and government ownership. These two alternative assumptions do not
change the qualitative analysis concerning private ownership; except that the ex ante




as the government agency is able to charge a fee B
p =f ( a
p,0 )–a
p – r only.
Neither do the alternative assumptions change the qualitative analysis concerning
government ownership, provided that Bh > - B. Suppose this is the case. Then under
government ownership, the pro politics government agency will charge Bl such that
Bl=v
G(r =0 )–( 1-lG)r, where v
G(r = 0) as defined before is the payoff the manager
receives after he pays Bl. And the pro business government agency will choose a
fee/subsidy Bh such that
Bh = f(a
G(r =0 ) ,x
G(r =0 ,ql)) + U(x
G(r =0 ,ql), ql)–a ( r =0 )-( 1-lG)r
–[ lGf(a
G(r =1 ) ,x
G(r =1 ,ql)) + U(x
G(r =1 ,ql), ql)].
And the separating equilibrium exists if
f(a
G(r =0 ) ,x
G(r =0 ,ql)) + U(x
G(r =0 ,ql), ql)–a ( r =0 )
–[ lGf(a
G(r =1 ) ,x
G(r =1 ,ql)) + U(x
G(r =1 ,ql), ql)] ³ -B+( 1-lG)r [2’]
In such an equilibrium, the ex ante payoff of the manager will be:
V
G = p{(1 - lG)f(a(r =1 ) ,x ( r =1 ,qh)) – a(r =1 )–B h}+( 1–p ) ( 1-lG)r.
Lemma 5: ¶V
P/¶r>¶V
G/¶r > 0. Proof: see Appendix.
According to Lemma 5, the less critical the slot is to the investment (i.e., r is larger), the
larger an amount of ex ante payoff the manager receives from the investment. Furthermore,
the manager’s ex ante payoff increases faster in r under private ownership than under
government ownership. This is because, under private ownership, the manager is the only
one that has the claim over r, whereas under government ownership, r is shared between
the government agency and the manager. Since the manager’s ex ante payoff is larger
under government ownership than under private ownership when r = 0, Lemma 5 implies
that there exists a threshold of r beyond which private ownership instead of government
ownership better promotes the ex ante managerial incentives.14
When the condition [2’] does not hold, there will no longer exist a separating equilibrium
under government ownership. Instead, a pooling equilibrium will emerge. In such an
equilibrium, the government agency’s type is not revealed. Accordingly, the government
agency will have no incentive to restraint itself from rent seeking, regardless whether it is
pro business or pro politics. I therefore focus on the pooling equilibrium where both types
of the government agency set the fee to extract as much as possible from the manager. That
is:
Bhl =( 1-lG)[pf(a
G(r =p ) ,x
G(r =p ,qh)) + (1 – p)f(a
G(r =p ) ,x
G(r =p ,ql))] – a
G(r =p )-( 1-lG)r.
In such an equilibrium, the ex ante payoff of the manager will be:
V
G =( 1-lG)r.
Whether government ownership or private ownership should be adopted depends on the
trade-off between the ex ante managerial incentives and the ex post efficiency. Given the
assumption that the political benefits the government agency received through hiring













G(r =1 ) ,x
G(r =1 ,qh)–a
G(r = 1)] + (1 – p)[f(a
G(r =0 ) ,x
G(r =0 ,ql)
–a
G(r =0 ) ]–e
G.
Since private ownership is always ex post efficient, government ownership may be more
efficient than private ownership only if it improves the ex ante managerial incentive.




Proposition 5: Government ownership is more efficient than private ownership only if
1. the slot is ‘critical’ to the investment, i.e., r is sufficiently small;
2. the government agency is likely to be pro business, i.e., p is sufficiently close and yet
not equal to one; and
3. the government agency has a sufficiently large fiscal budget if condition [2] does not
hold.
Proof: omitted.
I make the final note to highlight the importance of information asymmetry, or the
uncertainty of the manager regarding the government agency’s type, in determining the
possible dominance of government ownership.15
Corollary 3: Private ownership weakly dominates government ownership when p = 1 or
p = 0. Proof: omitted.
6. Interpreting China’s TVEs
The foregoing analysis corresponds to a number of stylized observations of China’s TVEs.
The conventional wisdom has argued that the rise of local government owned enterprises
in China is closely related to the underdevelopment of input markets and that local
governments have contributed ‘critical inputs’ to the growth of these enterprises; see
Chang and Wang (1994), Naughton (1994, 1996), Putterman (1997), and more recently
Chen and Rozelle (1999) and Tian (2000). Naughton (1994), for example, suggested the
control of ‘critical inputs’, such as land, by local governments as an important factor
explaining the emergence of China’s township and village enterprises.12 This analysis
reflects such wisdom nicely. Indeed, it shows that government ownership dominates
private ownership only when the input that the government agency controls is ‘critical’.
Nevertheless, this analysis also pushes the argument one step further. It explains why the
‘critical input’ needs to be acquired within the boundary of the firm instead of via market
transactions.
According to the property rights literature, ownership rights enhance the bargaining power
to the party that the rights are allocated to. In an environment where incentives of private
parties are important and local governments are as often counter-productive as they are
useful (in bringing the ‘critical inputs’, for example), ownership rights should be allocated
to private parties such as managers or entrepreneurs and the acquisition of ‘critical inputs’
should take place through market transactions (as Corollary 3 demonstrates). In other
words, ‘critical inputs’ argument itself does not rationalize the ownership arrangement.
This analysis adds a twist to the existing property rights literature. It captures two salient
features in the government-management relation in China’s TVEs. First, by having the
control of the firm, the local government is likely to interfere with the management and
such interference can be counterproductive (instead of productive as many studies typically
assume). Second, the manager of a township-village enterprise can never be absolutely
sure about how (and whether) the local government will interfere with the management. As
this analysis shows, these two features help account for the nature of government
ownership of TVEs. In particular, when allocating the input it controls, the local
government may behave softly (does not charge a bribe as much as possible) if it owns the
firm, but will behave aggressively otherwise. Accordingly, government ownership emerges
when the input is ‘critical’, since in this case the ‘leniency’ is especially valuable (without
the ‘leniency’, a large amount of rents will be appropriated by the local government).
Instead of restricting the attention to physical input, one may interpret the government-
regulated input in more broad sense. In particular, one may think of the input as
representing the political favor and support provided by local governments. In the early
stage of China’s economic transition, the political environment was hostile not only
towards private enterprises, but also towards TVEs as well. As they penetrated the
12 Indeed, local governments in rural China control not only land, but also water, electricity, business
licenses, access to financial capital and so on.16
transitional turf of state-owned enterprises, TVEs were once considered as a threat to the
state sector. Despite this, TVEs were able to flourish thanks to the political favor and
support granted by the local governments (Nee, 1992; Li, 1996).
It is interesting to note that some of the TVEs were first created by private entrepreneurs as
private firms and were later registered as TVEs. Even for those enterprises that were
established by local governments, it is often private entrepreneurs that were hired into the
management of these enterprises. These entrepreneurs chose to forego outside
opportunities such as creating their own firms despite their career success. In both cases, it
is evident that both entrepreneurs and local governments find it in their own interests to
team up together instead of having private firms, as this analysis has suggested.
One important implication of this analysis is that the ownership form of TVEs will evolve
in response to the dynamics of the institutional environment. Following the discussion
above, at least two institutional changes have significant impacts on the ownership
arrangement. One is the liberalization in ideology and hence political climate under which
the development of non-state sector and private firms in particular is regarded as legitimate
and an integral part of China’s economic transition. Such a change in ideology as well as
government policies towards private firms will inevitably induce a large-scale
transformation of TVEs from government ownership to private ownership. Another is the
development of the input markets. As input markets become liberalized, an increasing
number of inputs will be allocated through market mechanisms, free of bureaucratic
discretion. An increasing number of inputs allocated on the market helps cut into the local
government’s bargaining power vis-à-vis private enterprises as government-regulated
inputs become increasingly less relevant. The development of input markets also implies
more mobility of local enterprises. This induces competition among local governments as
well, reducing their bargaining power even further. In a recent empirical study, Jin and
Qian (1998) show that the role of the local government owned enterprises become less
prominent in areas with better-developed product markets; see also Chen and Rozelle
(1999) and Tian (2000).
The development of TVEs was not uniform across different regions of China even during
the early stage of economic reform. This analysis suggests that TVEs are likely to emerge
when the local government is more likely to be pro business and is well endowed in terms
of its fiscal budget. For example, in their studies of China’s local government owned
enterprises, Byrd and Gelb (1990) found that ‘(i)n relatively prosperous areas the
relationship between community governments and their enterprises tends to be mutually
beneficial’. They also noted, ‘(b)ut in poorer areas governments are forced to exploit their
enterprises, to the long-term detriment of both firms and community’.
The rapid development of local government owned firms did not take place until early
1980’s, when fiscal decentralization was introduced in China (Oi, 1992; 1994), Qian and
Weingast (1996), Wong (1992)). Fiscal decentralization devolved fiscal authorities from
the central to local governments and allowed local governments to maintain a large share
of fiscal revenues generated from the local economy, thus creating incentives for local
governments to promote local economies.13 Indeed, as this analysis suggests, the
dominance of TVEs requires that the local government is able to maintain the fiscal
13 See Oi (1992, 1994), Wong (1992), Qian and Weingast (1996), and Berkowitz and Li (1999).17
revenues generated from these enterprises for its own expense, without having to hand over
to higher level governments.
But, why did TVEs instead of private enterprises benefit particularly from fiscal
decentralization? By alluding to corruption, this analysis reveals a possible reason. That is,
fiscal incentives will not stop local governments from behaving predatory against private
firms,14 but will induce them to restraint themselves from rent seeking activities when
dealing with TVEs.
In contrast to local government owned enterprises, which have been the driving force of
China’s recent economic development, many state-owned enterprises have had
deteriorating financial performances despite the on-going enterprise reforms. In 1994,
more than 40 percent of state-owned enterprises incurred losses, which amounted to 6.1
percent of total industrial value added and one percent of China’s GDP. There are many
factors attributable to the lack-luster performance of state-owned enterprises. It is not the
purpose of this paper to exhaust all those factors. Instead, I shall simply suggest one
perspective of government ownership within the context of this particular analysis. Like
local government owned enterprises, state-owned enterprises from time to time rely on
government agencies at local level to provide inputs under regulation. However, unlike
local government owned enterprises, state-owned enterprises hand over a large share of
their returns to the central government, which either directly controls these enterprises or
delegates the control to local governments. Because government agencies at local level do
not have a significant share of revenues from state-owned enterprises, they have less
incentive to help these enterprises overcome bureaucratic barriers when allocating inputs
under their control. For the same reason, when these local government agencies exercise
the control of state-owned enterprises on behalf of the usually pro politics central
government, they will, according to this analysis, be pro politics as well, adding troubles to
the embattled state-owned enterprises.
7. Conclusion
I begin this paper with the observation that private enterprises in China have often suffered
from encroachment of local governments whereas firms with local government ownership
have flourished under the support of local governments. Inspired by this observation, I
present a study of ownership of firms when there are short of institutional mechanisms to
prevent government rent seeking activities. The purposes of this study are two folds. First,
I show how certain ownership arrangement, especially, government ownership, can serve
as a commitment mechanism through which government agencies will restrain themselves
from rent seeking activities. Such commitment is shown to promote private incentives and
ultimately benefits government agencies themselves. Second, I use this analysis to interpret
a host of empirical observations observed during the development of local government
owned enterprises in China, and to shed light on the relative success of these enterprises as
well as the possible dynamics of their future.
The current study is limited to a partial equilibrium analysis. In future research, one may
bring the analysis to a macro level by considering the relations between institutional
14 Indeed, it is straightforward to show that the government agency will try to extract as much rent as
possible from a private firm even when it generates tax revenues from the firm.18
dynamics (the liberalized input markets for example) and the evolution of ownership
forms. One particular point of interest is the relationship between the development of local
government ownership and the ‘dual track’ system in China, where resources are allocated
both through plans and on the emerging markets. Another interesting extension is to study
how the organization of government institution affects the ownership of a firm. The
organization of the government institution can be characterized as the allocation of many
different slots among various government agencies. Such a study may help us understand
why the relative success of local government ownership remains a phenomenon peculiar to
China, but not elsewhere like Russia.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: To show that the reaction function of the government agency x(a, q)i s
strictly decreasing in a, notice that the reaction function satisfies the first order condition:
¶U(x(a, q) q)/¶x+lG¶f(a, x(a, q))/¶x º 0




2f(a, x(a, q))/(¶x¶a) + [lG¶
2f(a, x(a, q))/¶x
2](¶x/¶a) = 0
Given the assumptions that ¶
2f(a, x(a, q))/(¶x¶a) < 0 and that both U(x, q) and f(a, x) are
concave in x, I therefore conclude that ¶x/¶a<0 .
To show that x(a, qh)<x ( a ,ql) for any managerial effort a, notice again that the optimal
choice of x given a and q satisfies the first order condition:
¶U(x, q)/¶x+lG¶f(a, x)/¶x=0
Since ¶U(x, qh)/¶x<¶U(x, qh)/¶x and both U(x, q)a n df ( a ,x )a r ec o n c a v ei nx ,i tf o l l o w s
that x(a, qh)<x ( a ,ql).
Proof of Lemma 3: I denote the payoff of the government agency at this stage as:
w(q; a(r)) = lGf(a
G(r) x
G(r, q)) + U(x
G(r, q) q)
where qÎ{qh, ql}. I differentiate w(q; a(r)) with respect to r. Using the envelope
theorem, I have:













¶w(qh; a(r))/¶r > ¶w(ql; a(r))/¶r.
Proof of Lemma 4: By definition,
v
G(r =0 )=( 1-lG)f(a
G(r =0 )x
G(r =0 ,ql)) – a(r =0 )
v
G(r =1 )=( 1-lG)f(a
G(r =1 )x
G(r =1 ,qh)) – a(r =1 ) .
Since x
G(r =1 ,qh)<x
G(r =0 ,qh) (according to the third part of Proposition 2) and
x
G(r =0 ,qh)<x
G(r =0 ,ql) (according to the first part of Proposition 2) the result is thus
obtained using the envelope theorem.22
a(r =p )
{B,a |W(B, a; qh)=W }
{B,a |W(B, a; ql)=
Proof of Proposition 3: Let W(B, a; q) denote the government agency’s payoff at this stage,
W(B, a; q)=lGf(a, x) + U(x, q)+B ,
where qÎ{qh, ql}. According to Lemma 3, W(B, a; q) has the single crossing property.
That is, for any (B, a)
Wa/WB(q = qh)>W a/WB(q = ql)
where Wa = ¶W/¶a and WB = ¶W/¶B. Accordingly, I can draw indifference curves for the
high type agency and the low type agency on the space of (B, a) as shown in the following
figure.
Figure 3
Indifference curves of the two type agencies
Notice that, in Figure 2, the indifference curves for the pro business government agency
are everywhere steeper than the indifference curves for the pro politics government agency
because of the single-crossing property. With this in mind, I proceed to prove the
proposition. First, I notice that the government agency can do no worse than charging a fee
so that the manager forms the ‘worst’ belief of the government agency. That is, the pro
politics government agency’s payoff is bounded below by
W(B = v
G(r =0 )a
G(r =0 ) ;ql)=f ( a
G(r =0 )x
G(r =0 ,ql)) + U(x
G(r =0 ,ql); ql)–a
G(r =0 ) .
And the pro business government agency’s payoff is bounded below by
W(B = v
G(r =0 )a
G(r =0 ) ;qh)=lGf(a
G(r =0 )x
G(r =0 ,qh)) + U(x
G(r =0 ,qh); qh)
+( 1-lG)f(a
G(r =0 )x
G(r =0 ,ql)) – a
G(r =0 ) .
Second, I notice that if condition [2] holds, there does not exist a pooling equilibrium that
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pooling equilibrium the pro business government agency can deviate by choosing a fee
B ³ 0 such that
lGf(a
G(r =1 )x
G(r =1 ,qh)) + U(x
G(r =1 ,qh); qh)+B>
lGf(a
G(r =p )x
G(r =p ,qh)) + U(x
G(r =p ,qh); qh)+B hl
and at the same time
lGf(a
G(r =1 )x
G(r =1 ,ql)) + U(x
G(r =1 ,ql); qh)+B<
lGf(a
G(r =p )x
G(r =p ,ql)) + U(x
G(r =p ,ql); ql)+B hl.
In other words, there exists a fee that only the pro business agency will (profitably) deviate
to under some posterior beliefs of the manger. Third, since the pro politics agency can do
no worse that having the payoff:
W(B = v
G(r =0 )a
G(r =0 ) ;ql)=f ( a
G(r =0 )x
G(r =0 ,ql)) + U(x
G(r =0 ,ql); ql)–a
G(r =0 ) .
therefore in a separating equilibrium (that survives the ‘intuitive criterion’ test) the pro
politics agency will charge the fee
Bl =( 1-lG)f(a
G(r =0 )x
G(r =0 ,ql)) – a
G(r =0 ) .
Thus a separating equilibrium exists if there exists Bh such that (1) the pro politics
government agency does no worse than W(B = v
G(r =0 )a
G(r =0 ) ;qh):
lGf(a
G(r =1 )x
G(r =1 ,qh)) + U(x
G(r =1 ,qh); qh)+B h ³
lGf(a
G(r =0 )x
G(r =0 ,qh)) + U(x
G(r =0 ,qh); qh)
+( 1-lG)f(a
G(r =0 )x
G(r =0 ,ql)) – a
G(r =0 ) ;
and (2) the pro politics government agency will not deviate to choose Bh:
lGf(a
G(r =1 )x
G(r =1 ,ql)) + U(x
G(r =1 ,ql); ql)+B h £
f(a
G(r =0 )x
G(r =0 ,ql)) + U(x
G(r =0 ,ql); ql)–a
G(r =0 ) .
Obviously, only one of these two conditions will be binding in equilibrium. It is also
evident that for a sequential equilibrium that survives the ‘intuitive criterion’ test, it must
be the second condition that binds (otherwise the pro business government agency can
increase Bh). When the second condition is binding, the first condition is reduced:
lGf(a
G(r =1 )x
G(r =1 ,qh)) + U(x
G(r =1 ,qh); qh)-lGf(a
G(r =0 )x
G(r =0 ,qh)) - U(x
G(r =0 ,qh); qh) ³
lGf(a
G(r =1 )x
G(r =1 ,ql)) + U(x
G(r =1 ,ql); ql)-lGf(a
G(r =0 )x
G(r =0 ,ql)) - U(x
G(r =0 ,ql); ql).
And the condition holds according to Lemma 3. Hence, if condition [2] holds, there exists
a separating equilibrium where the pro politics government agency will charge
Bl =( 1-lG)f(a
G(r =0 ) )–a
G(r = 0) and the pro business government agency will charge24
Bh ³ 0 such that the incentive compatibility condition for the pro politics government
agency (the second condition) binds.
Proof of Lemma 5: Under private ownership, ¶V
P/¶r = 1. Under government ownership,
¶V
G/¶r=-p ¶Bh/¶r + (1 – p)(1 - lG). To evaluate ¶Bh/¶r, notice that in a separating
equilibrium (that survives the ‘intuitive criterion’ test) the pro politics government agency
collects a fee Bl =v
G(r = 0) – r and the pro business government agency chooses a fee Bh
such that the pro politics government agency does not want to mimic. Accordingly, the pro
politics government agency has the payoff:
lGf(a(r =0 )x ( r =0 ,ql)) + U(x(r =0 ,ql) ql)+v
G(r =0 )–( 1-lG)r.
and when Bh ³ 0, the pro business government agency must choose Bh in equilibrium such
that:
lGf(a(r =0 )x ( r =0 ,ql)) + U(x(r =0 ,ql) ql)+v
G(r =0 )–( 1-lG)r =
lGf(a(r =1 )x ( r =1 ,ql)) + U(x(r =1 ,ql) ql)+B h,
in which case ¶Bh/¶r=-( 1-lG). This holds of course when Bh satisfies the non-negativity
condition, which now is
f(a(r =0 )x ( r =0 ,ql)) + U(x(r =0 ,ql) ql)-a ( r =0 )–( 1-lG)r
>lGf(a(r =1 )x ( r =1 ,ql)) + U(x(r =1 ,ql) ql). [2’]
When condition [2’] does not hold, the pro business government agency must charge a
subsidy Bh < 0 such that the pro politics government agency does not want to mimic:
lGf(a(r =0 )x ( r =0 ,ql)) + U(x(r =0 ,ql) ql)+v
G(r =0 )–( 1-lG)r =
lGf(a(r =1 )x ( r =1 ,ql)) + U(x(r =1 ,ql) ql)+( 1-lG)Bh,
in which case, ¶Bh/¶r=-1 .
In either case, ¶V
G/¶r>0a n d¶V
G/¶r < 1. Hence ¶V
P/¶r>¶V
G/¶r>0 .